By Merlion
July 13 2023

Man City were without full-backs in 2022 and Guardiola decided to implement 3-2-4-1 to accommodate Haaland, as well as to field three centre-backs. They struggled, inconsistently and allowed Arsenal to race ahead with 8 points lead. But come 2023, everything fell into places and the rest of EPL ran out of luck.  

The Spine of the Team in Rodri, Gundogan, Grealish and Haaland peaked and they won the title on a canter in the home stretch. Come CL Cup Final, Guardiola just made a minor adjustment to 3-2-2-3 with Rodri-Stones as defensive midfielder and Gundogan-De Bruyne as attacking midfielder. This is actually an updated version of Herbert Chapman “WM” formation.

In 1932, Herbert Chapman developed a new playing system called WM. This system became revolutionary because it provided, for the first time, a numerical balance between defenders and forwards. This system enabled a coverage of all playing spaces – defence, midfield and attack.

Subsequently, it evolved into WW system, a forerunner of 4-3-3, with five defenders, two midfielders and three forwards. The purpose was to regain possession and counter-attack, counter-attacking and positional interchanging between forwards are vital to this system. Between 1931 and 1935, Hugo Meisel, coach of Austrian National Team, created the 4-3-3. In defensive terms they were the first team to collectively press their opponents. It was not only the defensive players but the offensive players were also performing collective defensive organisation and pressing. During offensive, great mobility is demanded from all players, required players to constantly interchanging to create additional problems to the opponents, and also expected defensive players to be involved in the offensive.

Mikel Arteta 4-3-3 went off a flying start in 2022 with Partey as part of the 5-man defence and Xhaka-Odegaard as the attacking midfielders. But the collective pressings were not fluid enough and compact, leaving gaps in the defence with defensive players out of position when being counter-pressed and balls lobbed behind Arsenal midfield. Plus, both Martinelli and Saka was rather fixed at their respective flanks and little mobility interchanging with Jesus and Nketiah. That was our downfall post WC2022 when teams via video and data analytics discovered the flaws in Arteta 4-3-3 and successful to prevent Arsenal from scoring and performed successful counter-attacks.

Due to the lack of depth in 2022/23 squad, which was the primary reason to lose the 2022/23 title, there was a sharp drop in quality when the squad was rotated. This was the main reason why Mikel Arteta was so reluctant to rotate the squad. Therefore, barring 4-3-3, there was no Plan B, which compounded the problem by rendering so predictable. This was commented on by Frank the Brentford Manager after the 1-1 draw when he said that “he had already known what to do with the expected Arsenal team.”

 Whither Arsenal FC?

It is a good sign that during this summer, Edu and Mikel Arteta had started to address this issue by buying Kai Havertz, Rice and Timber with a view of at least of two equivalent players per position, plus to address those vulnerabilities from last season by injecting a degree of unpredictability into tactical formation.

Plan A is 4-3-3 with Havertz-Rice-Odegaard as the Midfield-3 with Rice as part of the 5-man Defence, functioning as the libero that has superb positional awareness, excellent reading of the game and sharp anticipation to intercept passes and launch counter-attack instantly by a quick pass or to drive forward between lines. And he has two mobile and creative midfielders as targets to launch his quick and accurate passes. A successful counter-press will result in an instant 5-3-2 attacks with speed with both Zinchenko and Timber (or White) cutting inward while both Martinelli and Saka are speeding along side-lines to drag defenders to the side-lines, thus opening up the centre zone. This tactical formation was very successful in 2022, and Mikel Arteta can improve it further with between communication and hopefully, after one full season, telepathic understanding had developed amongst Zinchenko, Martinelli, Saka and Odegaard, with an intelligent Jesus, Havertz and Rice not far behind.

Taking a leaf from Guardiola, Plan B should be 3-2-2-3 with Rice-White as the Defensive Midfielder. The key is that Rice functions as the Libero, commanding the penalty area, and sweeping the vacuum between Defence and Midfield Zone, while other defenders (Gabriel-Saliba-Timber) and White are joining the attack. When Rice joins the attack, White is the Libero. During Defensive duties, White is effective the stopper man-marking the opponent centre-forward, with Rice sweeping in front of Back-3 to anticipate and close down passing channels. Ideally, Rice and White should develop telepathic understanding to seamlessly interchange from defend to counter-attack with one driving forward, the other remaining behind as sweeper in front of Back-3 or to fall into Back-3 when any centre-back vacated the defensive line to join the attack. 3-2-2-3 enables Arsenal to squeeze plays within a 30-metre zone from centre-line to penalty box with any line not more than 10 metre apart.

When Rice surges forward, he needs “walls” for the ball to rebound to him once he plays “give and go” or one-two. “Walls” is actually Havertz, Martinelli, Jesus, Saka and Odegaard where Rice receives the return and moves into goal-scoring position or to setup another free player with opponent defence pulled apart and in disarray. More coaching and training are required such that players can read Rice’s feet. E.g., if Rice should play a soft pass, it meant to give it back. If the pass was sharp, the receiver was supposed to do something with it.

Havertz-Odegaard partnership is more mobile and Havertz is a better playmaker than Xhaka. Opponents are faced with the dilemma of marking two playmakers with both quick Martinelli and Saka at the side-lines. Opponents cannot afford to deploy 2 or 3 markers to kick or rough up Saka and/or Martinelli out of the game. This will leave Havertz and Odegaard in acres of space to pick and choose their passes.

A left-side Diamond of Rice-Martinelli-Havertz-Jesus will overload left flank if opponent focus on a threatening Saka and Odegaard behind him. Similarly, a right-side Diamond of Rice-Saka-Odegaard-Jesus will overload right flank if opponent is marking Martinelli with Gabriel surging forward.

But more coaching is required on training Martinelli and Saka to play “give and go”, moving for return passes, and if surrounded, to instantly execute a quick pass to any team-mates running into clear channel. That was a short-coming last season. The failure to beat a 2- or 3-man press with a quick pass and teammates making themselves available for a quick pass.

Over to you Mikel Arteta to coach this “Level 3” 2022/23 team to jump to “Level 4” to battle for the 2023/24 title to last game of the season.